By Ethan Connell
A destroyer can empty its entire complement of launch cells in a single engagement. Refilling these cells requires nearly three years, and that timeline is observable by adversaries such as Beijing.
Between October 2023 and January 2025, U.S. warships defending Red Sea shipping from Houthi attacks fired 120 SM-2 and 80 SM-6 interceptors, 160 rounds of 5-inch gun ammunition, and 20 Evolved Sea Sparrow and SM-3 missiles. Vice Admiral Brendan McLane disclosed this tally in January 2025. Nearly 400 munitions were used in 15 months against an adversary lacking a conventional navy.
Each engagement lasted only seconds, yet the replacement process operates on a much longer timeline. The Missile Defense Agency and the Navy requested 540 SM-6 and 214 SM-3 missiles in the fiscal 2027 budget. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), fulfilling these orders will require 36 to 39 months to initiate deliveries after congressional appropriation.
A launch cell is depleted as soon as a missile is fired. Refilling it necessitates a complex process involving rocket-motor manufacturing, machining, energetics production, and inspection, all conducted at facilities distant from naval bases.
Production capacity as a deterrent
Modern naval engagements involve two critical domains: the maritime operational environment and the industrial base, where replenishment processes begin.
Maritime deterrence is typically assessed by tangible assets such as hull numbers, carrier availability, attack submarine inventories, and launch cell counts. However, three additional factors are equally significant: magazine depth, which refers to the munitions available on ships or in theater; fleet generation, defined as the capacity to construct new vessels and restore damaged ones; and surge capacity, the demonstrated ability to redirect qualified production resources when multiple operational theaters require support at the same time.
Adversaries can assess these factors without direct intelligence assets, as delivery schedules, maintenance backlogs, and shipyard throughput are publicly available. Industrial vulnerabilities are therefore apparent well before any conflict begins.
A fully stocked vertical launch system serves as a deterrent against an initial attack. A production base capable of replenishing these systems deters sustained campaigns. Although the weapons themselves are not interchangeable, many depend on overlapping industrial inputs. Skilled labor, advanced machining capacity, rocket motors, energetics, precision castings and forgings, and inspection capabilities support many major weapons programs.
Ukraine accesses this industrial base via the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List, which allows NATO member states to procure munitions from U.S. inventories. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) notes that deliveries to Kyiv are delayed as the U.S. administration prioritizes domestic stockpiles.
The 39-day campaign against Iran also depleted these inventories. Stocks of Tomahawk, Patriot, and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems will require at least three years to return to pre-conflict levels. Notably, naval munitions were expended sparingly, yet Standard Missile inventories are not expected to recover until early 2029.
A contingency involving Taiwan would present opposite conditions. The vast distances in the Pacific, limited forward-deployed munitions, and the high expenditure rates of strike weapons, anti-ship missiles, torpedoes, and mines would quickly exceed the capacity of any resupply system.
Ukraine, the Middle East, and Taiwan place different demands on U.S. industry, but those demands overlap in key areas and compete for portions of the same production base. Neither the Navy nor the defense industrial base has received clear guidance on prioritization.
What a shortage looks like from the bridge
Limited production capacity results in operational caution, leading commanders to conserve scarce interceptors when countering inexpensive drones. In October 2024, the Navy conducted its first at-sea reload of a launch cell, transferring a canister to the cruiser USS Chosin from a Military Sealift Command ammunition ship. This capability is only effective if an adequate supply of canisters exists.
Submarine construction exemplifies these challenges over an extended period. Since fiscal year 2018, Congress has allocated approximately $9.8 billion to the submarine industrial base. The Virginia-class production rate has consistently fallen short of the Navy’s goal of two boats per year, averaging only 1.1 to 1.2 since 2022. Delivery timelines have slipped by 24 to 36 months. Rear Adm. Jonathan Rucker informed Congress that the Navy would not meet its production targets, attributing the delays to late-arriving sequence-critical materials that disrupt the planned construction sequence.
Repair capacity is frequently overlooked. Between fiscal years 2008 and 2018, attack submarines accumulated 10,363 days of idle time and maintenance delays while awaiting shipyard availability. For example, Boise remained pierside for over two years without entering a shipyard. Any battle damage would further prolong these delays.
Money is not capacity
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found the Defense Department spent more than $5.8 billion on the shipbuilding industrial base from fiscal 2014 through 2023, planned $12.6 billion more through 2028, and had yet to fully determine the effectiveness of that support.
The Navy requires qualified production capacity that is established prior to demand, operates at scale without compromising naval standards, and expands through increased machinery and workforce shifts. As CSIS notes, THAAD production currently stands at 96 interceptors per year, and increasing output to 400 would require additional facilities and tooling, rather than simply increasing appropriations. Physical infrastructure and equipment are essential.
What the bet looks like
The Navy is testing that proposition. On March 20, Navy Secretary John Phelan opened Factory 4 in Cherokee, Alabama, a 2.2 million-square-foot former railcar plant where Hadrian will produce sequence-critical and commodity components for the Virginia and Columbia classes. More than $1.5 billion in private capital sits alongside $900 million in Navy funding that Defense One describes as non-recurring engineering across three planned facilities. A follow-on plant targets castings and forgings, a chokepoint the Navy has named in testimony for years.
Three features make this model noteworthy. It builds capacity in advance of crises. It relocates component work inland, away from Groton and Newport News, allowing the two submarine yards to focus on modules and final assembly. It is also designed for reconfiguration: Hadrian is producing for the autonomous surface vessel, while Anduril and HD Hyundai are developing under the Navy’s Modular Attack Surface Craft program. In December, they signed a memorandum of understanding with Lockheed Martin to establish a machining and inspection cell for PAC-3 MSE, THAAD, PrSM, and GMLRS. Stringent qualification standards govern naval components, and automation cannot accelerate the rigorous testing, certification, and SUBSAFE requirements necessary for submarine safety. New manufacturing facilities frequently encounter setbacks. For example, the Defense Department inspector general reported in July that a shell plant in Mesquite, Texas, constructed with nearly $500 million in Army funding, had not produced any conforming projectile parts as of March 2026.
This situation highlights the necessity of initiating production expansion early. Increasing output from an already qualified supplier is efficient because it does not require additional qualification. In contrast, establishing a new production source is a lengthy process due to qualification requirements, making early action essential.
What Congress and the Navy should do
- Allocate funding based on tangible output rather than ceremonial milestones. Industrial base investments should be linked to the delivery of accepted components, reduced lead times, and completed hulls, in accordance with the metrics recommended by the GAO.
- Relocate component manufacturing away from waterfront shipyards. Identify component families that require significant shipyard labor and qualify inland factories to produce these parts.
- Prioritize investment in reconfigurable production capacity. Determine which production cells can transition among priority component families within six, twelve, or eighteen months, and allocate funding accordingly. Unmanned vessels should be designed with common structures and shared production files to facilitate rapid replacement.
- Incorporate replacement rates into war-gaming scenarios. Operational planning currently tracks missiles expended and ships damaged but should also account for the speed at which industry can replenish these assets.
Beijing will evaluate American resolve not just by budget allocations or fleet projections, but by the United States’ ability to replace expended munitions, repair combat damage, and produce new vessels at a rate that exceeds losses. The maritime industrial base is not simply a support element; it determines the fleet’s endurance. A Navy unable to reload can only deter until its magazines are depleted, whereas a Navy supported by visible surge capacity can deter beyond the initial engagement.
Ethan Connell is an Assistant Director at Taiwan Security Monitor and a graduate student at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government. His research focuses on maritime security and cross-Strait military affairs, with particular attention to mine countermeasures and the use of PRC state media organs to promote narratives about Taiwan. Professionally, Ethan has previous experience performing maritime risk analysis for the Department of the Navy’s National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office. His work can be found in the Taipei Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Diplomat, the Center for Maritime Strategy, and the Financial Times.