By Yunus Emre Tümen

The U.S. Navy chose an existing European design, the Italian FREMM, as the parent for the Constellation-class frigate to reduce technical risk and accelerate delivery. In 2024, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that construction began with an incomplete design, and it forecast a delivery delay of at least 36 months for the lead ship. The Congressional Budget Office reported expected FREMM design commonality falling from about 85 to 15 percent. In November 2025, the Navy terminated work on four of six ships under contract. The next month, it announced FF(X), based on Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Legend-class National Security Cutter.

Changing the parent design does not remove the decision habits that undermined Constellation. The Navy can avoid repeating that cycle by protecting a simpler frigate baseline and distributing selected additional capabilities to uncrewed partners. The crewed ship must retain essential organic capability, human judgment, command, and physical intervention. Offboard capability must be demonstrated with the support that makes it available.

Constellation’s difficulties reflected requirements growth, necessary adaptation to U.S. standards, incomplete engineering, premature construction, and rising costs. Shipyard capacity imposed a separate constraint. The central lesson is that building before changes have been absorbed into a complete design turns design change into construction disruption. Replacing the parent while preserving that sequence invites another restart.

The program’s design-progress metric rewarded document submissions without adequately assessing their quality. Such metrics can present engineering work as finished while unresolved changes are still propagating into construction. Naval War College professor James Holmes warns that leaders must be prepared to veto changes if the new frigate is to avoid Constellation’s design creep.

The Navy envisions FF(X) complementing larger warships, carrying modular payloads, and commanding uncrewed partners. Antisubmarine equipment, vertical launch cells, and mission packages are each defensible on their own. Collectively, they can consume the cost and schedule advantages of a cutter parent. The question is which functions belong aboard now, which can be provided offboard, and which must wait for demonstration.

Naval Postgraduate School professor James Wirtz proposes a frigate built around the distinctive contribution of its people, operating with uncrewed partners and retaining space, cooling, and electrical capacity for later development. This approach could relieve pressure on the hull, but each additional partner also demands communications, control personnel, and support. An expanding network of uncrewed partners could recreate requirements growth aboard the very ship meant to escape it.

The initial control task therefore needs explicit limits: a small cell overseeing a defined number of partners, with margins reserved for one specified next increment. Pairing partners with a frigate is most useful where people on scene must interpret ambiguous contacts, coordinate operations, board vessels, rescue people, or repair damage. For example, two uncrewed partners could track contacts during a gray-zone incident while the frigate’s crew boards a suspect vessel. The arrangement must preserve those functions without making every new partner another reason to redesign the frigate.

Protect the baseline ship design

Before construction, define the ship’s bounded role, essential self-defense, boats and boarding teams, initial control cell, maintainability provisions, and reserved weight, space, power, and cooling margins. Complete basic and functional design first. A technical review should verify the completed three-dimensional model against reliable equipment data and resolve critical integration issues; each block’s detail design should be complete before it is built. Equipment removal routes and access for repair must survive the pressure to pack additional systems into available space.

Some adaptation is unavoidable. Each proposed change should therefore pass a recorded decision rule: demonstrate its operational necessity; identify what it displaces or defers, including margins consumed and whether a partner or later increment could supply the function; and state its consequences for engineering, integration, crew, maintenance, support, cost, and schedule. The Navy’s Portfolio Acquisition Executive Maritime should approve, reject, or defer the change after review with operational and technical authorities.

For unproven or out-of-role demands, the default should be no change. Protecting margins requires the same discipline: consuming reserved capacity for an immediate convenience can eliminate the ability to add the capability for which it was intended. A simpler ship remains useful only if its essential functions and capacity for planned development survive these decisions.

Test the frigate, its partners, and their support together

Surveillance provides a practical first test. Wirtz proposes fielding surveillance partners first, before adding more demanding functions. Test whether one or two accompanying vessels extend coverage within limits on control-cell size, support, and cost. The frigate should retain navigation and surface-search sensors, baseline point defense, and the crew’s physical capabilities. Against serious air threats, the frigate would need protection from other ships or would have to restrict its operations; partner-based air defense remains unproven.

Evaluate the entire arrangement, with realistic external support, against the baseline frigate operating alone. Measure mission performance, availability across repeated mission cycles, and whether fuel, repair, and ammunition can reach each element. Trials should include communications failure, partner loss, restricted emissions, and loss of a support site. Component reliability alone does not establish mission endurance. Claims about electronic silence must count the control links’ own emissions. For each loss case, specify the remaining mission, limits on endurance and threat exposure, and the point at which the frigate must restrict operations or withdraw.

Sustainment is part of the design problem. GAO’s Littoral Combat Ship assessment shows the operational risks when maintenance responsibilities and resources are unresolved. Uncrewed partners still need people to maintain, control, and interpret them. A disabled partner may require a boarding or recovery team. RAND Corporation’s analysis of contested naval logistics identifies supply-chain constraints that prevent available stocks and industrial capacity from reliably meeting wartime demand.

The operating concept must therefore identify where each element is refueled, rearmed, and repaired, what people and equipment are required, and what happens when that location becomes unavailable. Unless those arrangements work, moving equipment offboard merely relocates risk. A useful baseline frigate can enter service before its partners are proven, but unproven partners should not be counted as delivered combat capability. Testing should also show that workload and recovery demands remain within the crew and control-cell limits protected by the baseline.

Add capabilities in demonstrated increments

An increment, whether offboard weapons, another partner function, an antisubmarine package, or vertical launch on a later flight, should enter only after demonstrating its performance and support within the operating arrangement. It must fit reserved margins without unplanned changes to hull, propulsion, power, or cooling. RAND’s work on adaptable ships emphasizes the importance of accommodating future requirements during initial design; Wirtz notes that engines and hull length generally cannot be changed once built.

An unready increment should return to development while the ship serves in its baseline role. A failed one should go back through the decision rule rather than automatically trigger a frigate redesign. This connects incremental development to an enforceable limit on requirements growth, rather than treating every promised capability as an immediate construction obligation.

FF(X) can escape Constellation’s cycle if the Navy protects the baseline, demonstrates uncrewed partners together with their support, and admits further capability only in increments that fit. Success would be observable: construction beginning on a complete design, changes traceable to recorded exception decisions, and partners counted only after proving their contribution under degraded conditions.

 

Yunus Emre Tümen is an MA candidate in Applied Strategy and International Security at the University of Plymouth. His writing has appeared in RealClearDefense, Geopolitical Monitor, and Arctic Portal.

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